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BOOK REVIEWS
AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE. By William Wirt Blume. New York:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1955. Pp. xv, 432. $6.50.
The author of this book is a recognized authority in the field of
civil procedure. He has written many law review articles and books
on varied aspects of civil procedure. There can be no question but
that he is uniquely qualified to write a textbook on American Civil
Procedure.
I have read Professor Blume's book from the point of view of one
who has spent many years studying, teaching and writing on civil
procedure with specific reference to the law of New York. Read from
such an approach, I find that the book gives an antiquated notion of
the law of procedure presently effective in the State of New York.
I shall leave to others the task of making a critical analysis of the
book with reference to the law of other states.' I undertake here the
limited role of examining the book with a view of determining the
extent to which it is reflective of the present law of New York. In
making the analysis, I set forth below several aspects of procedure
treated by Professor Blume, and indicate in respect to them: (1) the
existing law of New York; (2) Professor Blume's statement of the
law; and (3) an occasional comment.
A. Service of Summons - Acquisition of Jurisdiction
(1) The last three decades have been notable in New York for
statutory enactments authorizing acquisition of in personam jurisdic-
tion over defendants absent from the jurisdiction.
Sections 52 and 52-a of the Vehicle and Traffic Law make pos-
sible the procurement of in personam jurisdiction of absentee motor-
ists. Section 52, enacted in 1928, affects service of a summons on a
nonresident motorist. Section 52-a affects service of a summons on
a resident motorist who departs from the state.
Section 250 of the General Business Law, enacted in 1952, makes
possible the procurement of in personam jurisdiction of nonresident
owners and operators of aircraft who are absent from the state. The
section authorizes the procurement of an in personam judgment if the
primary service is made on a state official. In this respect, the statute
corresponds to the motorist legislation.
I See Frampton, Book Review, 8 J. LEGAL ED. 379 (1956); Schmulowitz,
Book Review, 42 A.B.A.J. 258 (1956).
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Section 229-b of the Civil Practice Act, enacted in 1940, author-
izes service on a nonresident natural person doing business in New
York by service of the summons upon his agent. Service thus made
gives rise to in personam jurisdiction.
Section 227-a of the Civil Practice Act, enacted in 1949, author-
izes service of a summons upon an attorney of record for a nonresident
plaintiff in a subsequent action brought against the plaintiff (in the
first action) by the defendant (in the first action). Commencement
of the first action by the nonresident plaintiff is deemed a designation
of his attorney as his agent to receive process in any action commenced
against him by the defendant in any court of New York. Service of
the summons on the attorney for the plaintiff in the first action sus-
tains acquisition of in personam jurisdiction in the second action.
Section 235 of the Civil Practice Act, last revised in 1949, au-
thorizes personal service without the state without an order in any
case on a defendant domiciled in the state, and sustains in personam
jurisdiction.
(2) Chapter 7 of Professor Blume's book deals with the com-
mencement of a civil action. Subdivision C of the chapter titled,
"How Commenced," includes a consideration of the methods of ac-
quiring jurisdiction over a defendant. The subdivision comprises
thirteen pages.2 The introductory paragraph to this subdivision reads:
Before a court can effectively act on a claim for relief, other than to
dismiss it, jurisdiction over the claim must be invoked in the manner provided
by lav. The steps taken to invoke jurisdiction (1) in the old courts of common
law, (2) in the old courts of chancery, (3) under codes patterned after the
New York Code of 1848, and (4) under the Federal Rules of 1938, will be
outlined separately.3
The problem of bringing defendants before the court, including proof
of service of summons, is considered in six pages. The modern
methods of effecting service of summons are disposed of in thirteen
lines of the text. The significant problem of immunity of defendants
from service of process is adverted to only in a brief footnote.4
(3) In my judgment, the modern statutory methods for acquir-
ing in personam jurisdiction of defendants are of extreme significance
and are first rate examples of modem devices to cope with the problem
of acquiring jurisdiction over absentee defendants. It is difficult to
see how readers of Professor Blume's book will get any notion of the
great strides which have been made in this area of procedure.
2 Pp. 270-83.
3P. 270.
P. 277 n.19.
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B. Appearance
(1) The doctrine of appearance (general and special) constitutes
for most students an elusive concept, and generally requires thorough
analysis and amplification. The doctrine of special appearance has
been explicitly developed in Section 237-a of the Civil Practice Act
adopted in 1951.
(2) In Professor Blume's book, voluntary appearance takes the
form of a footnote 5 consuming about fifteen lines, if we exclude cita-
tions to law review articles and A.L.R. treatment.
(3) In my judgment, this is a wholly inadequate treatment of
an area of procedure which students have difficulty in understanding,
and experts have difficulty in analyzing.
C. Joinder of Causes of Action
(1) Section 258 of the Civil Practice Act, last amended in 1949,
contains most liberal provisions for joinder of causes of action. The
section provides:
The plaintiff may join in the same complaint two or more independent or
alternate causes of action, regardless of consistency, whether they are such as
were formerly denominated legal or equitable, provided that upon the applica-
tion of any party the court may in its discretion direct a severance of the
action or separate trials whenever required in the interest of justice. There
may be a like joinder of causes of action when there are multiple parties and
the requirements for joinder of parties are satisfied.
There is no limitation on the right of a plaintiff to join as many causes
of action as he has, irrespective of their nature.
(2) Professor Blume, in dealing with the problem of joinder of
claims,0 sets forth the text of the provision governing joinder as it
appeared in the New York Code of 1848,7 though the stated provision
bears no resemblance to the present Section 258 of the Civil Practice
Act. Professor Blume sets forth the text of the liberal rule of joinder
as expressed in the Federal Rules.
(3) The difficulty with this treatment is that readers may assume
that the law of New York is quite antiquated in the light of the cor-
responding Federal Rule. The present liberal rule governing joinder
of causes of action was expressed in the New York Civil Practice
Act years before the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective
in 1938.
5 P. 275 n.9.
6 pp. 339-42.
P. 340.
[ VOL. 30
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D. Joinder of Parties
(1) Section 212 of the Civil Practice Act, last amended in 1949,
governs permissive joinder of parties. The section is extremely liberal
in the allowance of joinder of parties.
(2) Professor Blume discusses the problem with reference to the
restricted provisions of joinder as expressed in the New York Code
of 1848. The more liberal aspects of later provisions in New York
governing joinder of parties is disposed of by very brief references."
(3) It is difficult to see how readers of Professor Blume's book
can get any notion of the progress that has been made in recent years
in this area of the law.
E. Counterclaims
(1) The Civil Practice Act is extremely liberal in the allowance
of counterclaims. A defendant may set up as a counterclaim a cause of
action whether the same is related to the plaintiff's cause of action or
is wholly independent thereof.9 A defendant may allege as many
counterclaims as he has, whether they are legal or equitable.
(2) Professor Blume refers to the New York Code of 1848
which made no provision for counterclaims, and a section added thereto
in 1852 which authorized a defendant to set up a counterclaim pro-
vided it arose out of the contract or transaction set forth in the com-
plaint or was connected with the subject of the action.
(3) Professor Blume refers to the Federal Rule authorizing
unrestricted counterclaims but omits to indicate that this was the rule
in New York even prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in 1938.
F. Demurrers and Motions Addressed to Pleadings
(1) Motions for judgment addressed to pleadings superseded the
common-law demurrer in New York in 1921, and are governed by
Rules of Civil Practice (Rules 106-111). These Rules make possible
a quick and early determination of a case by the simple procedural
device of a motion.
(2) Professor Blume refers to the common-law demurrer as gov-
erned by the New York Code of 1848,10 but fails to indicate the sub-
stantial areas in which motions for judgment may be made in instances
where the common-law demurrer could not achieve the purpose.
8 Pp. 336-38.
9 N.Y. CIv. PRAC. AcT §§ 262, 266 (a§ amended in 1936).
10 Pp. 362-64.
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(3) Professor Blume refers to the Federal Rules but without
noting that, in the main, the Federal Rules have been paralleled by
the Rules of Civil Practice effective in New York for many years.
G. Interpleader
(1) The law affecting interpleader was substantially revised in
New York in 1954.11 An action of interpleader may be commenced
by a stakeholder without procuring leave from the court. A defendant
stakeholder may prosecute a defensive interpleader without application
to the court.
(2) Professor Blume disposes of the whole matter of interpleader
in a little more than six lines.'
2
(3) A reading of Professor Blume's treatment of the subject does
not give the reader any clear notion as to the problems implicit in
interpleader, nor does it give any indication of what efforts have been
made to meet the problems.
In my judgment, Professor Blume who, as stated at the outset
of this review, is uniquely equipped to present a modern picture of
the state of civil procedure in this country, has failed to do so. The
larger part of the book deals with antiquated and now superseded
rules of procedure. The book is neither fair to the writer nor to the
reader. It is not fair to the writer because of his possession of a
thorough understanding of modem systems of procedure. It is unfair
to the reader in that he is made familiar with much of what the law
was but not enough of what the law is.
Louis PRASHKER.*
AmERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw. By Bernard Schwartz.t Cam-
bridge, England: The University Press, 1955. Pp. xiv, 364.
$5.00.
This treatise from a comparative law viewpoint (the British and
French political systems supplying the comparative standards) adds
the virtue of brevity to an accurate and comprehensive survey of
American constitutional law. Approximately half of the pages
(Part I. "The Structure") present an illuminating summary of lead-
ing cases and comments on the doctrine of judicial review, federalism
and the traditional roles of the respective branches in tripartite gov-
11 See N.Y. CIv. PRAC. AcT §§ 285-87.
12 P. 256.
* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
t Professor of Law and Director of the Institute of Comparative Law,
New York University.
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